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Google attention and target price run ups 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We explore the increase in the share prices of target firms before their merger 
announcements. We use a novelty Google search volume to proxy the market expectation 
hypothesis according to which firms with an abnormal upward change in Google searches are 
identified as firms with potential merger activity. We find that Google indicators can explain 
a larger percentage of the price increase in target firms before their mergers than the 
Financial Times. However even the Google proxy of the market expectation hypothesis can 
only explain at best 36 percent of the target price run ups.  
Keywords: Target price run ups, mergers, market anticipation, Google search volume  
JEL classification: G14; G34 
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Google attention and target price run ups 
 
1. Introduction 
A number of academic studies have reported that share prices of target firms do increase 
significantly prior to their merger announcement and have developed two hypotheses to 
explain such a pattern. According to the insider trading hypothesis (Keown and Pinkerton, 
1981), staff from the target, bidding, or financial institution that organized the transaction 
trade or even pass such information on to relative members. According to the alternative 
market expectation hypothesis (Jensen and Ruback, 1983), investors, based on publicly 
available information, manage to predict target firms prior to their merger announcements.  
This paper focuses on the latter hypothesis exploring whether the target price run ups 
are driven by public information. Prior studies have used media coverage to proxy the market 
expectation hypothesis, with investors being able to predict target firms as long as such 
information was documented in the media. Early studies in the field (e.g., Pound and 
Zeckhauser, 1990; Zivney et al., 1996) have focused on the newspaper coverage of a 
particular column, such as the columns Heard on the Street and/or Abreast of the Market, 
with more recent studies (e.g., King, 2009) incorporating a wider coverage of articles with the 
assistance of databases such as Factiva. The majority of those studies have concluded that 
media coverage can only explain part of the increase in target share prices prior to their 
merger announcements. Within the UK literature, Holland and Hodgkinson (1994) explore 86 
target firms from 1988 to 1989 and Siganos and Papa (2012) 1,059 firms between 1998 and 
2010. Within Holland and Hodgkinson’s limited sample, rumors covered by Financial Times 
(FT) drive to a large extent the UK target price run ups. Siganos and Papa report that in line 
with international literature, FT coverage of rumors can only explain a small percentage of 
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the upwards UK target pattern. However, prior studies have not captured all publicly 
available information; as an example, none of the prior UK/international studies in the field 
has incorporated investors’ discussions on online sites such as Hotcopper.com.au, though 
Clarkson et al. (2006) and Chou et al. (2010) have found that such merger rumors have a 
significant impact on firms’ share returns. Therefore, prior studies’ conclusions may be 
biased due to the limited news coverage.  
Based on the difficulty of capturing all available public information, we explore an 
alternative approach to proxy the market expectation hypothesis by using the volume of 
Google searches for target firms. Google is the most widely used web search engine and the 
only search site that offers historic searching volume data appropriate for academic 
purposes.1 If investors encounter a rumor of a potential merger, most investors may use 
Google to search for further information on the target company before proceeding with a 
transaction; therefore, firms featured in a rumor are expected to experience an abnormal 
increase in Google search activity. A few recent studies have reported the significance of 
Google searches as a measure of investor attention. Da et al. (2011) explore the best proxy of 
investor attention in US firms and find that Google searches capture investor attention earlier 
than existing proxies, such as newspaper coverage, and Bank et al. (2011) support the 
significance of Google search volume as a proxy of investor attention in German stocks. 
Other recent studies have also shown the significance of Google searches within alternative 
fields in finance. Da et al. (2012) report that Google searches are value relevant and have the 
ability to predict firms’ revenue surprises, and Drake et al. (2011) report that Google searches 
are related to firms’ price and trading volume levels before and on the earnings 
announcement day, with firms with high Google activity prior to the announcement 
experiencing a smaller price and volume response on the announcement day.  
                                                            
1 For a brief review of Google, study http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google (last accessed September 2012). 
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We study the Google search volume of target firms within the merger context to 
explore whether the mergers were expected by investors. We first explore whether Google 
search volume can predict mergers before such rumors are reported in FT and, second, 
whether Google attention can explain the target price run ups pattern. As an example, Figure 
1 shows daily Google search volume for RHM plc between October and December 2006; 
Premier Foods plc acquired RHM plc on 4th December 2006. We find an increase in the 
volume of RHM’s Google search activity a few days prior to the merger announcement: 
Google attention was 0.13 on 29/11/2006, 0.19 on 30/11/2006, 0.39 on 1/12/2006, 0.59 on 
2/12/2006, 0.80 on 3/12/2006, and 1 on 4/12/2006, before moving back to normal levels of 
Google attention.2 Between October and December 2006, we have only identified two FT 
articles that document a potential merger deal for RHM, published on 2/12/2006 (Wiggins 
and Hume, 2/12/2006) and on 3/12/2006 (Wiggins, 3/12/2006). There is, therefore, a sign that 
investors were searching for information on RHM plc earlier than FT covered potential 
merger activity.  
To test our argument, we manually download daily Google activity for 340 UK target 
firms between March 2004 and December 2010. We adopt the outlier literature to identify 
abnormal upward changes in Google searches by using the boxplot method (Tukey, 1977), 
which makes no distributional assumptions. Following an event study analysis, we estimate 
excess returns of target firms before their merger announcement date and before the first date 
that abnormal Google activity was signaled. We find that Google indicators tend to offer a 
takeover signal a few days earlier than FT, and we therefore find that Google indicators 
explain a larger percentage of the price increase in target firms than a conventional FT 
                                                            
2 Notice that Google search data are given at a relative value to the total searches in the sample period requested 
that ranges between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates the day with the maximum number of searches. Also notice that 
Google search volumes may slightly change when collected at different points in time, since Google calculates 
the values from a subset of the full archive to increase the response speed. In line with Da et al. (2011), we 
download results for a few firms within alternative times and find that the correlation of the data is above 0.95; 
we therefore conclude that our results are not driven by such approximations.   
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coverage proxy. Nevertheless, even after estimating excess returns before the Google merger 
signals, the target price run ups remain economically and statistically significant, showing 
that Google indicators cannot fully explain the price pattern. We find that Google can explain 
at best merely 36 percent of the target price run ups.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section explains the data 
and methodology used, section 3 discusses the empirical results and section 4 concludes the 
study.  
 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1 Data collection 
We use Thomson OneBanker to have access to all UK target firms with at least a 50 percent 
level of acquisition between March 2004 and December 2010. To be selected in the sample, a 
target firm should have an available Datastream code in Thomson OneBanker (to link 
Thomson OneBanker and Datastream), daily share returns3 and a ticker symbol in 
Datastream. In line with other studies that have used Google data (e.g., Da et al., 2011), we 
use the ticker, rather than the name of the firm, to collect data from Google, since tickers are 
prominently used by investors rather than by consumers interested in a firm’s product. The 
final sample consists of 430 target firms. In unreported results, we find that the increase in the 
share prices of those target firms commences 30 days prior to their merger announcement, 
which sets the sample period of the study and is well in line with the time frame used in the 
majority of studies in the field (e.g., Holland and Hodgkinson, 1994). 
                                                            
3 We use the RI data type that incorporates dividend payments in the estimation of share returns. 
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Two main data sources are used to explain the target price run ups. First, we 
download FT coverage for target firms from NewsBank.4 In line with Dyck et al. (2008) and 
Ferguson et al. (2011), we focus on FT coverage since FT is the most influential newspaper 
with the most credibility among investors and is also the most comprehensive for firms’ 
financial news. Siganos and Papa (2012) and Holland and Hodgkinson (1994) are also the 
only other UK studies in the target price run ups literature, and both studies have used FT 
coverage to proxy news; we therefore focus on FT for comparison purposes.  
Second, we manually download daily Google activity for each target firm by using the 
Google insight website.5 Notice that Google offers historic volume data since January 2004, 
which determines the sample period of the study. Out of 430 target firms, 95 firms do not 
have available daily Google data, since Google reports research volume data only if a search 
is above a minimum threshold. We retain all 430 firms in our analysis, since limited Google 
searches for a target firm indicate that investors did not manage to predict the merger. The 
Google search data are also given as a relative value to the total searches in the sample period 
requested, which ranges between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating the day with the maximum 
number of searches. We use the worldwide selection to identify firms’ research volume over 
time to incorporate the activity of international investors and, since we require daily 
frequency, we also set a three-month period before each firm’s merger, which covers the 
period that the target price run ups pattern is present.6     
2.2 Determining abnormal upward change in Google activity 
We estimate abnormal Google volume using two measures for robustness purposes: 
                                                            
4 Notice that the FT data used in this study have also been used by Siganos and Papa’s (2012) study exploring 
the target price run ups in the UK between 1998 and 2010. The current study instead focuses on whether Google 
indicators can explain the target price run ups pattern and whether Google can explain a larger percentage of 
returns than FT. For a more detailed description on FT data, please study the above mentioned paper. 
5 http://www.google.com/insights/search/ (last accessed September 2012). 
6 If the length of the search is longer than three months, data are only available in a weekly frequency. 
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)1ln()1ln(1 1−+−+= ititi GoogleGoogleAGoogle                                       (1) 
)]1(),...,1(ln[)1ln(2 5041 −− ++−+= itititi GoogleGoogleMedianGoogleAGoogle        (2) 
where itGoogle  is the Google activity of firm i on day t  that we adjust to a range 
between 1 and 2 for estimation purposes. iAGoogle1  and iAGoogle2  are estimated daily 
from -40 days to the day of the merger announcement to capture the target price run ups. 
iAGoogle1  shows the daily change in Google search volume and iAGoogle2 shows the 
abnormal daily change above the normal Google activity for each target firm, as estimated by 
the median number of searches about the firm between -41 and -50 days before the merger. 
Figure 2 shows the cumulative abnormal Google searches for both measures from -30 days 
until the day the merger was announced. The figure shows that both iAGoogle1  and 
iAGoogle2 tend to show an increase in Google activity closer to the merger announcement 
day, with such upward pattern being stronger for iAGoogle2 . The average daily growth of the 
Google search volume over the last five days prior to the merger announcement for 
iAGoogle1 / iAGoogle2 is 0.29/0.40 percent, and the corresponding growth on the day of the 
merger announcement is 0.37 and 1.19 percent, respectively.   
To identify the first day that investors are aware of a potential merger, we first use FT 
coverage and select the first rumor article available for each target firm. Since iAGoogle1  
and iAGoogle2  are continuous variables, we follow the outlier literature to determine 
abnormal upward changes. To determine the most appropriate statistic to explore outliers, 
Table 1 explores the distribution of both measures. We find that iAGoogle1  and iAGoogle2  
are positively skewed (0.11 and 0.25, respectively), with acute peaks (11.13 and 9.41, 
respectively), and Kolmogorov Smirnov statistics show that iAGoogle1  and iAGoogle2 do 
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not follow normal distribution at the 1 percent level. We therefore use the boxplot method 
(Tukey, 1977) to identify outliers, which makes no distributional assumptions and is 
applicable to data that is not heavily skewed. We identify outliers as follows:    
)13(*5.13 iiiit QQQOutlier −+>                                                    (3) 
where iQ3 and iQ1  are, respectively, upper and lower quartiles for firm i over the period 
between -40 days and the day of the merger announcement. The first abnormal upward 
change in Google activity for each firm is the first signal of a potential takeover activity.  
Table 2 explores the relationship between Google and target share returns. Panel A of 
Table 2 explores whether Google’s abnormal upward changes in iAGoogle1  and iAGoogle2  
have an impact on share returns on the day that those signals were identified as well as over 
the following days. Notice that excess returns at day t  indicate a simple arithmetic average 
across all target firms for that day and for robustness reasons, we estimate alternative risk-
adjusted excess returns: the market excess returns ( iMER )
7, the CAPM market-adjusted 
returns ( iCAPMER )
8, and the three-factor model adjusted returns ( 3iFFER )
9. We find that the 
daily market-adjusted returns ( iMER ) for iAGoogle2  are 1.74, 1.57, 0.81, and 0.25 percent 
on day t , 1+t , 2+t , and 3+t  after the takeover signal, with returns being statistically 
significant at least at the 10 percent level until two days after the signal. These results show 
that there is a link between abnormally high Google searches and corresponding share 
                                                            
7 MtitiM RRER −= , where itR  is the return of firm i in day t, and MtR is the market return (FTSE All Share) 
in day t. 
8 )ˆˆ( MtiMiitiCAPM RbaRER +−= , where iMi ba ˆ,ˆ coefficients are estimated over the interval from -41 to  
-120 days before the merger announcement (day 0). 
9 )ˆˆˆˆ(3 tiHMLtiSMBMtiMiitiFF HMLbSMBbRbaRER +++−= , where tSMB  and tHML  reflect the size 
and book/market risk proxies, respectively. The factors are estimated in line with Fama and French (1993). 
iHMLiSMBiMi bbba ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  coefficients are estimated over the interval from -41 to -120 days before the merger 
announcement (day 0).      
10 
 
returns; therefore, when we estimate at a later stage returns before such merger signals, 
excess returns are expected to decrease. 
Panel B of Table 2 further explores the robustness of prior result by testing whether there 
is in general a positive relationship between share returns and Google activity. We estimate 
the following OLS regression: 
itititititit uAGoogleaAGoogleaAGoogleaAGoogleaaER +++++= −−− 34231210    (4) 
where all three measures are used to estimate excess returns itER  ( iMER , iCAPMER  and 
3iFFER ) and both Google’s volume are employed ( iAGoogle1  and iAGoogle2 ). We estimate 
the above regression within firms with data available between their initial takeover signal and 
their merger announcement day. Notice that all days/data per firm between the merger 
announcement and the first merger signal are incorporated into the regression. In unreported 
results, we also estimate the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs), to test for potential 
multicollinearity amongst the explanatory variables, and find that most VIFs are slightly over 
1 and the maximum VIF is equal to 2.15. These results show that there is no evidence of 
multicollinearity.  
Empirical results to some extent support findings reported at Panel A of Table 2, since we 
find that there is a positive relationship between contemporaneous/lagged Google activity and 
target share returns when up to two lags are employed. In unreported results, we further re-
estimate above regression per day before the merger announcement day and find that the 
findings of the relationship between Google activity and share returns tend to remain similar 
across the days between the merger announcement and the initial merger signal. Overall, in 
line with existing literature (e.g., Da et al., 2011), these results support the positive 
relationship between Google volume and share returns within the UK merger context.           
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3. Empirical results 
3.1 Initial findings 
Before we estimate excess returns in relation to takeover signals, we offer a description of our 
abnormal Google variables in relation to FT coverage. Panel A of Table 3 shows the number 
of firms with potential takeover activity that was found. Following the boxplot method, we 
find that 150 ( iAGoogle1 ) and 116 firms ( iAGoogle2 ) out of the total of 430 firms were 
found to be signaled as potential target firms. Stated differently, the boxplot method offers 
outliers only in firms that experience significant abnormal upward changes in Google 
volume. FT offers rumor articles for 127 firms. Interestingly, we find that the first signal of 
potential merger activity is on average -20 days prior to the merger for both Google variables 
and -16 days for FT, showing that Google search volume of firms on average increased 
significantly before rumor articles were published on FT. 
Panel B of Table 3 also explores whether Google indicators and FT identify the same 
firms as potential target firms. For example, iAGoogle1  and FT similarly identify that 249 
firms are or are not to become targets, while such indicators show a different outcome in the 
remaining 181 firms (a total of 430 firms). Both measures therefore indicate the same signal 
in merely 58 percent of the firms. We therefore conclude that there is a variation of firms that 
Google variables and FT identify as potential targets, with signals being relatively close 
between iAGoogle1 and iAGoogle2  from construction, showing that Google abnormal 
upward changes do not simply reflect FT’s coverage of rumors.          
Panel C of Table 3 also explores firms for which both Google indicators and FT signal 
potential merger activity, and shows which of the signals appears first. In line with the above 
results, we find that Google indicators seem to precede those of FT; as an example, out of 48 
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firms with iAGoogle1  and FT signals, iAGoogle1  shows a takeover signal first in 34 of those 
firms. Results are even stronger in favor of iAGoogle2  in relation to FT (22 out of 28 firms).  
Overall, to some extent in line with Da et al. (2011) and Bank et al. (2011), these results 
show that Google indicators seem to capture investor attention earlier than media coverage. 
3.2 Estimation of excess returns 
We then follow an event study analysis to explore the abnormal returns prior to the merger 
announcement and prior to the abnormal upward change in Google activity. Table 4 shows 
the daily returns until five days before the merger announcement (day 0) and the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) every ten days over the thirty days prior to the merger. Excess 
returns at day t  indicate a simple arithmetic average across all target firms for that day and 
CAR( kj, ) indicates the sum of those daily excess returns between day j and k . Panel A of 
Table 4 shows the excess returns in relation to the merger announcement and indicates that in 
line with the literature (e.g., Gupta and Misra, 1989; Mathur and Waheed, 1995; King, 2009), 
share prices of target firms increase significantly before their merger announcement, where 
the rate of increase is higher closer to the merger announcement. For example, cumulative 
market excess returns ( iMER ) are 5.09, 2.69, and 1.53 in the intervals (-1,-10), (-11,-20), and 
(-21,-30), respectively. CAR (-1,-30), which are to be explained by Google indicators, are 
9.30 ( iMER ), 10.82 ( iCAPMER ), and 10.04 ( 3iFFER ) percent, with returns being statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
We then explore whether iAGoogle1  (Panel B of Table 4) and iAGoogle2  (Panel C 
of Table 4) can explain such profitability of target firms by estimating excess returns before 
the first iAGoogle1 / iAGoogle2  signal (when there is one available) or otherwise before the 
merger announcement day. Stated differently, day 0 reflects the day with the first merger 
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signal, otherwise the merger announcement day. For brevity reasons we only discuss the 
market excess returns ( iMER ), since conclusions are identical for alternative excess 
estimations ( iCAPMER , 3iFFER ). CAR (-1,-30) are 5.91 prior to iAGoogle1  and 7.13 prior to 
iAGoogle2  (versus 9.30 percent before the merger announcement), with all returns 
remaining economically and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Our results 
therefore show that Google indicators used in the study fail to fully explain the target price 
run ups pattern, showing that the increase of target share prices could not be predicted by 
market participants. We find that Google indicators can explain at best only 36 percent of the 
target price run ups at the time interval between -1 and -30 ( iAGoogle1  / iMER  scenario).  
We then explore whether Google can explain a larger percentage of excess 
profitability than conventional FT coverage, and we therefore compare excess returns 
between FT coverage and iAGoogle1  (Panel D of Table 4), and FT coverage and iAGoogle2  
(Panel E of Table 4). Results show that Google indicators show a signal a few days earlier 
than FT, and the difference in excess profitability between FT and iAGoogle1 / iAGoogle2  is 
economically and statistically significant at the 1 percent level when estimating CAR (-1,-
10). CAR (-1,-30) also show that excess returns are always lower for Google indicators in 
relation to those found for FT. Such differences may be economically significant, with 
returns varying from -0.77 to -2.34 depending on the excess return measure followed, but 
they are statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level.10    
Overall, we find that Google indicators explain a larger percentage of targets’ excess 
returns before their merger than FT. Nevertheless, Google indicators can only capture a 
relatively small part of the target price pattern.  
                                                            
10 For example, the excess return of -2.34 percent shown in Panel D of Table 4 has a p-value equal to 0.13. 
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3.3 Robustness tests 
We undertake a number of tests to explore the robustness of our key results. We find that 
6.28 percent of the tickers are noisy, such as ‘ice’, ‘boy’, and ‘fee’, and, in line with Da et al. 
(2011), we exclude them from the sample and re-estimate prior analyses. Panel A of Table 5 
shows the results. Notice that due to space considerations, we only show excess returns for 
CAR (-1,-10) and CAR (-1,-30) prior to iAGoogle1 , iAGoogle2 , and the difference in 
corresponding returns between Google indicators and FT. We find that after controlling for 
noisy tickers, results are similar with those reported in Table 4. Google indicators may fail to 
explain in full the target price run ups, but Google indicators explain a larger percentage of 
such profitability than FT. Cumulative abnormal returns in the interval between -1 and -10 
are always economically and statistically lower for iAGoogle1  and iAGoogle2  than 
corresponding excess returns for FT. 
In addition, we re-estimate prior tests based only on 345 firms with 100 percent merger 
activity. This test explores whether prior results were driven by the sample selection of target 
firms with over 50 percent merger activity. Panel B of Table 5 shows that prior results hold 
within such subsample.  
We further conduct tests of the stability of our results during the sample period since the 
sample includes the financial crisis. Figure 3 explores the annual cumulative excess returns in 
the interval between (-1,-10) and (-1,-30) for FT coverage, iAGoogle1 , and iAGoogle2 . We 
find that results are strong regarding CAR (-1,-10), with excess profitability being lower for 
Google indicators than FT in all seven years. Regarding CAR (-1,-30), results are weaker in 
favor of iAGoogle1  and iAGoogle2 , since Google indicators display respectively lower 
excess returns in five and four (out of seven) years than those reported in FT. We further 
explore the impact of financials on prior results. Financials may have received increased 
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Google search volumes during the financial crisis and therefore, an increase in Google 
activity in a financial firm may be driven due to the crisis rather than to a takeover rumor. We 
exclude from the sample 47 financials and re-estimate excess returns. Panel C of Table 5 
shows that results remain similar within the non-financial subsample and we therefore 
conclude that the financial crisis does not drive the results of the study.    
We further explore whether our results are driven by firms that reported financial year 
end results close to the merger announcement, since such firms may face increased Google 
search activity due to such information rather than to a takeover signal. We exclude 64 firms 
with financial results reported up to 60 days prior to their merger announcement and re-
estimate excess returns. Panel D of Table 5 shows the results. We find that excess returns are 
reduced slightly across portfolios, showing that Google search activity is related with firms’ 
financial year end results, however prior determined price patterns hold strong within the sub-
sample.       
Overall, our robustness tests support our prior conclusions on the significance of Google 
indicators capturing target firms earlier than FT, but without managing to explain the target 
price run ups pattern.   
 
4. Conclusion 
A number of studies (e.g., King, 2009) have found that the share price of target firms 
increases before their merger announcements. Studies that have explored whether investors 
could have predicted the target firms have used media coverage as a proxy, with investors 
managing to predict a merger as long as a rumor was reported before the announcement. 
Based on the difficulty of capturing all information available to investors, especially in recent 
years, when internet resources and chat discussions are heavily used, we followed an 
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alternative approach. If investors encounter a rumor of a potential merger, most investors 
may use Google to search for further information on the target company before proceeding 
with a transaction; therefore, firms that feature in a rumor are expected to experience an 
abnormal increase in Google search activity.  
We used the outlier literature, and more specifically the boxplot method (Tukey, 
1977), to identify the days that target firms experience an abnormal upward change in Google 
use of targets’ tickers, signaling potential merger activity. We then followed an event study 
analysis to estimate excess returns before the merger announcement and before the Google 
takeover signals. We found that Google indicators tend to signal target firms earlier than FT; 
therefore, the excess returns prior to Google indicators are lower than those reported prior to 
FT. Nevertheless, we found that Google indicators cannot explain the target price run ups and 
can capture at best merely 36 percent of the increase in the target price pattern. Although we 
did not explore insiders’ transactions, part of the remaining upwards price pattern could be 
attributed to private information.  
The findings of the study are of interest to regulators. The Takeover Panel has been 
responsible for the takeover rules in the UK since 1968. As an example, on 19th September 
2011 the Panel implemented amendments on the existing takeover code to minimize the 
target price run ups and amongst others, target firms were given the responsibility to make 
publically available any bid approach.11 Future research can explore whether such changes to 
the regulations may increase the significance of public information on explaining the UK 
target price run ups.       
 
 
                                                            
11 http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/transitionalarrangements.pdf (last 
accessed September 2012). 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of Google indicators  
 
iAGoogle1   iAGoogle2  
Average 0.03%  0.05% 
Median 0.00%  0.00% 
Min -69.31%  -57.66% 
Max 69.31%  69.31% 
Standard deviation 8.40%  10.53% 
Skewness 0.11  0.25 
Kurtosis 11.13  9.41 
Kolmogorov Smirnov 0.09***  0.11*** 
Notes: This table offers the descriptive statistics of indicators generated by Google Data. iAGoogle1  shows 
the daily change in Google volume between days -40 and 0 (day 0 = merger announcement day) and 
iAGoogle2 shows the abnormal daily change between days -40 and 0 above the normal Google activity for 
each firm as estimated by the median number of searches for each firm between -41 and -50 days before the 
merger announcement. *** shows significance at the 1 percent level.    
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Table 2 
Google activity and target share returns 
 
iMER  iCAPMER  3iFFER   iMER  iCAPMER  3iFFER  
Panel A: Impact of Google merger signal on share returns (%) 
 iAGoogle1   iAGoogle2  
t                1.68*** 1.64*** 1.59***  1.74*** 1.73*** 1.66*** 
 1+t   0.93** 0.94** 0.99**  1.57** 1.57** 1.40** 
2+t              0.58* 0.66* 0.58*  0.81* 1.01** 0.91* 
3+t                 0.92* 1.01* 0.97*  0.25 0.29 0.36 
Panel B: Regression analysis      
N 3,461 3,461 3,461  2,345 2,345 2,345 
1a                0.040** 0.038** 0.033*  0.028 0.028 0.027 
2a   0.013 0.014 0.012  0.087*** 0.086*** 0.085*** 
3a              0.038** 0.039** 0.037**  0.010 0.013 0.017 
4a  0.016 0.018 0.021  -0.063** -0.059** -0.059** 
        
 F-stat          2.082* 2.001* 1.736  3.949*** 3.988*** 4.083*** 
Notes: Panel A explores whether Google’s abnormal upward changes in iAGoogle1  and iAGoogle2  
have an impact on share returns on the day that those signals were identified as well as over the following three 
days; 1+t , 2+t , and 3+t . Excess returns indicate a simple arithmetic average across all target firms for that 
day. Panel B explores whether there is in general a relationship between share returns and Google activity by 
estimating itititititit uAGoogleaAGoogleaAGoogleaAGoogleaaER +++++= −−− 34231210  
where all three measures are used to estimate excess returns itER  ( iMER , iCAPMER  and 3iFFER ) and both 
Google’s volume are employed ( iAGoogle1  and iAGoogle2 ). The regression is estimated on firms after the 
initial takeover signal and only the slope coefficients are presented for brevity reasons. N shows the number of 
observations used. We follow the boxplot method (Tukey, 1977) to identify abnormal upward changes for 
iAGoogle1  and iAGoogle2 , where iAGoogle1  shows the daily change in Google volume and 
iAGoogle2 shows the abnormal daily change above the normal Google activity for each firm as estimated by 
the median number of searches for each firm between -41 and -50 days before the merger announcement. 
iMER  shows the difference between share and market (FTSE All Share) returns, iCAPMER  shows the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model’s risk-adjusted returns, and 3iFFER shows the three-factor model’s risk-adjusted returns. *, 
**, and *** show significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.    
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Table 3 
Comparison of takeover signals  
 iAGoogle1  iAGoogle2  ierageFT cov  
Panel A: Coverage of firms    
With a takeover signal 150 116 127 
Without a takeover signal 280 314 303 
Average days -20 -20 -16 
Median days -21 -22 -15 
Panel B: Agree/disagree signal of merger activity   
iAGoogle1   310/120 249/181 
iAGoogle2    243/187 
Panel C: First signal of a takeover activity  
iAGoogle1 vs ierageFT cov  34  14 
iAGoogle2 vs ierageFT cov   22 6 
iAGoogle1 vs iAGoogle2  35 38  
Notes: This table compares signals of takeover activity among iAGoogle1 , iAGoogle2 , and 
ierageFT cov . Panel A shows the number of firms with and without a takeover signal and how many days 
before the merger (day 0) those signals occur. Panel B explores the extent to which alternative indicators predict 
the same outcome as to whether a firm would become a target firm. As an example iAGoogle1  and FT 
similarly identify the outcome in 249 firms, while the outcome differs at the remaining 181 firms. Panel C 
explores which of the signals appears first. iAGoogle1  shows the daily change in Google volume and 
iAGoogle2 shows the abnormal daily change above the normal Google activity for each firm as estimated by 
the median number of searches for each firm between -41 and -50 days before the merger announcement. 
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Table 4   
Estimation of excess returns (%) 
 iMER  iCAPMER  3iFFER   iMER  iCAPMER  3iFFER  
Panel A: In relation to merger announcement  Panel B: In relation to iAGoogle1  
0 15.74*** 15.86*** 15.80***  10.25*** 10.37*** 10.32*** 
-1 2.31*** 2.30*** 2.23***  1.34*** 1.32*** 1.27*** 
-2 0.84*** 0.88*** 0.94***  0.43** 0.50*** 0.58*** 
-3 0.31* 0.32** 0.25  0.34* 0.42** 0.29* 
-4 0.56*** 0.64*** 0.60***  0.13 0.23 0.12 
-5 0.18 0.22 0.18  -0.05 -0.02 -0.08 
        
CAR (-1, -10) 5.09*** 5.56*** 5.25***  2.43*** 3.03*** 2.68*** 
CAR (-11, -20) 2.69*** 3.05*** 2.75***  2.70*** 3.20*** 2.97*** 
CAR (-21, -30) 1.53*** 2.21*** 2.04***  0.78 1.64*** 1.54*** 
CAR (-1, -30) 9.30*** 10.82*** 10.04***  5.91*** 7.88*** 7.20*** 
Panel C: In relation to iAGoogle2             Panel D: FTAGoogle i −1   
0 11.82*** 11.97*** 11.94***  -2.50* -2.48* -2.57* 
-1 1.57*** 1.53*** 1.52***  -3.44*** -3.46*** -3.34*** 
-2 0.51*** 0.52*** 0.63***  -0.52** -0.55** -0.47 
-3 0.45** 0.50*** 0.39**  0.14 0.12 0.04 
-4 0.20 0.32** 0.29*  -0.13 -0.09 -0.17 
-5 0.06 0.10 0.05  -0.10 -0.14 -0.19 
        
CAR (-1, -10) 3.60*** 4.08*** 3.87***  -4.02*** -4.07*** -3.97*** 
CAR (-11, -20) 2.28*** 2.64*** 2.35***  1.40 1.55* 1.66* 
CAR (-21, -30) 1.25*** 2.02*** 1.92***  0.28 0.39 0.59 
CAR (-1, -30) 7.13*** 8.74*** 8.14***  -2.34 -2.11 -1.71 
Panel E: FTAGoogle i −2    
0 -0.93 -0.88 -0.94     
-1 -3.21*** -3.25*** -3.10***     
-2 -0.44 -0.52* -0.42     
-3 0.25 0.21 0.14     
-4 -0.06 0.00 0.00     
-5 0.01 -0.02 -0.06     
        
CAR (-1, -10) -2.86*** -3.02*** -2.78***     
CAR (-11, -20) 0.98 0.99 1.04     
CAR (-21, -30) 0.75 0.77 0.97     
CAR (-1, -30) -1.13 -1.25 -0.77     
Notes: This table shows the estimation of excess returns prior to the merger announcement (Panel A), prior to 
iAGoogle1  (Panel B), and prior to iAGoogle2  (Panel C). Therefore ‘0’ represents the merger 
announcement day at Panel A and either the day with the first iAGoogle1 / iAGoogle2 signal or otherwise 
the merger announcement day at Panels B and C. -1, -2, -3, -4 and -5 show days prior day 0. Panels D and E 
compare the excess returns found in FT in comparison to those reported in iAGoogle1  and iAGoogle2 , 
respectively. iAGoogle1  shows the daily change in Google volume and iAGoogle2 shows the abnormal 
daily change above the normal Google activity for each firm as estimated by the median number of searches for 
each firm between -41 and -50 days before the merger announcement. Excess returns at day t  indicate a simple 
arithmetic average across all target firms for that day and CAR ),( kj  indicates the sum of those daily excess 
returns between day j and k . We follow alternative risk-adjusted excess returns: iMER shows the difference 
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between share and market (FTSE All Share) returns, iCAPMER shows the Capital Asset Pricing Model’s risk-
adjusted returns, and 3iFFER shows the three-factor model’s risk-adjusted returns. *, **, and *** show 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.    
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Table 5 
Robustness tests (%) 
 iMER  iCAPMER  3iFFER   iMER  iCAPMER  3iFFER   iMER  iCAPMER  3iFFER   iMER  iCAPMER  3iFFER  
 Panel A: Excluding noisy tickers  Panel B: Excluding firms with less than 100% merger activity 
Panel C: Excluding financials  Panel D: Excluding firms with 
financial year end results 60 days 
before their merger announcement 
 CAR (-1,-10) 
In relation to iAGoogle1  2.53*** 3.22*** 2.82***  3.06*** 3.69*** 3.31***  2.89*** 3.43*** 2.91***  2.33*** 2.87*** 2.40*** 
In relation to iAGoogle2  3.78*** 4.35*** 4.11***  3.92*** 4.56*** 4.26***  4.09*** 4.49*** 4.11***  3.07*** 3.43*** 3.18*** 
FTAGoogle i −1   -4.12*** -4.14*** -4.09***  -3.90*** -4.01*** -3.88***  -4.17*** -4.36*** -4.40***  -3.79*** -3.81*** -3.75*** 
FTAGoogle i −2  -2.87*** -3.01*** -2.80**  -3.04*** -3.14*** -2.93***  -2.97*** -3.30*** -3.20***  -3.05*** -3.25*** -2.97*** 
 CAR (-1,-30) 
In relation to iAGoogle1  6.03*** 8.23*** 7.35***  6.94*** 9.16*** 8.43***  6.58*** 8.28*** 7.27***  5.76*** 7.23*** 6.36*** 
In relation to iAGoogle2  7.33*** 9.15*** 8.37***  8.41*** 10.48*** 9.85***  7.83*** 9.13*** 8.19***  6.56*** 7.61*** 6.90*** 
FTAGoogle i −1   -2.42 -2.14 -1.73  -2.07 -1.91 -1.46  -2.70 -2.68 -2.30  -2.51 -2.27 -1.98 
FTAGoogle i −2  -1.12 -1.22 -0.71  -0.60 -0.59 -0.04  -1.45 -1.83 -1.38  -1.71 -1.89 -1.44 
Notes: This table shows the excess returns of three robustness tests when excluding noisy tickers (Panel A), when excluding target firms with less than 100 percent merger 
activity (Panel B), when excluding financials (Panel C) and when excluding firms with financial year end results up to 60 days prior to their merger announcement (Panel D). 
CAR (j ,k) indicates the cumulative excess returns in the interval between days j and k. iAGoogle1  shows the daily change in Google volume and iAGoogle2 shows the 
abnormal daily change above the normal Google activity for each firm as estimated by the median number of searches for each firm between -41 and -50 days before the 
merger announcement. We follow alternative risk-adjusted excess returns: iMER shows the difference between share and market (FTSE All Share) returns, iCAPMER shows 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model’s risk-adjusted returns, and 3iFFER shows the three-factor model’s risk-adjusted returns. ** and *** show significance at the 5 and 1 percent 
levels.    
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Fig. 1. Google trend search for RHM plc    
 
Notes: This figure represents the daily output for a Google trend search of ‘RHM’ between October and 
December 2006. High/low historic trend indicates high/low numbers of searches in Google. Notice that RHM 
plc was acquired by Premier Foods plc on 4th December 2006. 
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Fig. 2.  Cumulative abnormal Google searches 
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Notes: This figure shows the cumulative Google volume until the merger announcement day (day 0). iAGoogle1  shows the daily change in Google volume and 
iAGoogle2 shows the abnormal daily change above the normal Google activity for each firm as estimated by the median number of searches for each firm between -41 and 
-50 days before the merger announcement. 
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Fig. 3. Annual excess returns ( 3iFFER )                
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Notes: This figure shows the annual cumulative excess returns in the interval between (-1,-10) and (-1,-30) for FT coverage, iAGoogle1 , and iAGoogle2  during the 
sample period. iAGoogle1  shows the daily change in Google volume and iAGoogle2 shows the abnormal daily change above the normal Google activity for each firm as 
estimated by the median number of searches for each firm between -41 and -50 days before the merger announcement. For brevity reasons, results are shown only for 
3iFFER , which shows the three-factor model’s risk-adjusted returns (conclusions remain unchanged when alternative excess return methods are estimated). 
